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Abstract 
The Central European countries have been members of the European Union (EU) since 
2004. During the process of their transformation towards democracy and market 
economy, the four Visegrad countries (V4) – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia – were strongly supported by Western European EU members, particularly 
Germany, which was especially interested in the EU Eastern enlargement. Later on, 
Germany undertook a similar approach in assisting the transformation towards 
democracy and market economy in the countries included in the Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) initiative, forming the Eastern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy. 
Unlike in the past, however, current Berlin policy-makers are no longer willing to 
support an Eastern enlargement of the EU. Nevertheless, Germany expects the V4 to 
intensively engage with the EaP countries (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine) and to share their experiences from the political and economic 
transformation they underwent. The V4 countries, having regularly stressed the 
importance of deeper and wider cooperation within the EaP, have proved able to meet 
German expectations concerning their role in the EaP project. In a period marked by 
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numerous disputes between the V4 states and Germany (with the migration crisis at the 
top of the list), the convergence of Germany’s preferences with those of the V4 
countries within the EaP initiative is an encouraging sign of a continuing intensive and 
deep cooperation among Germany and the V4 countries. 
 
Keywords: Germany, Visegrad countries, the Eastern Partnership. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Visegrad Four (V4) countries (i.e. 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) turned to the West for 
political and administrative models, for economic and technological 
advancement, as well as for security. As a result, V4 countries have been 
thoroughly transformed and to a certain degree have started to serve as a source 
of inspiration for other post-communist states. The Central European countries 
became members of the EU at a time of crucial institutional, political and 
economic EU reform. They are aware of the fact that their active engagement in 
European affairs and in the European common foreign, security and defense 
policy is possible only in close cooperation with Germany. Kristína Mikulová, 
speaking on Central Europe’s pivot to Germany, points to the fact that “Central 
Europe’s pivot to Germany is not yet complete and perhaps never will be, given 
the complexity of state-to-state relationships in the multi-layered EU context, 
and the tug of nationalist interests in some parts of the diverse region, but the 
cooperation between Central Europe and Germany is undoubtedly deepening.”1 
The migration crisis that erupted in 2015 generated serious disputes between 
Germany and the V4 countries and significantly burdened mutual relations; 
however, from the long-term perspective, it has not destroyed the link. Many 
possibilities continue to exist for Central European countries and Germany to 
prove an intensive cooperation exists both at the bilateral and at the multilateral 
level, with the Eastern Partnership (EaP) project being one of them.  
The EaP is a joint initiative which involves the EU, its member states and 
six Eastern European countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the 
Republic of Moldova and Ukraine – with a goal to build a common area of 
shared democracy, prosperity, stability and increased cooperation. The EaP was 
established as a specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP), which contains a bilateral and a multilateral track. It was 
launched, based on a 2008 Polish proposal, at the Prague Summit in 2009. The 
EU is committed to building strong and mutually beneficial relations with all 
six partners, irrespective of their individual level of ambition in their relations 
                                               
1  Kristína Mikulova, “Central Europe’s Velvet Power: Can It Reinvigorate EU Foreign 
Policy?,” World Affairs 176, no. 3 (2013): 65. 
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with the EU. Bilateral relations are based on differentiation whilst the 
multilateral EaP structure offers an inclusive framework involving all six 
partner countries.
2
 Germany perceives the EaP as an initiative that is conducive 
to German interests, but at the same time as one that could undermine them. 
Berlin would like the EaP to be an instrument that brings the partner countries 
closer to the EU economically but not politically. Moreover, Germany has set 
its own bilateral cooperation with partner countries in the East above the joint 
projects of the Eastern Partnership.
3
 The EU membership of the six above-
mentioned countries has not been on the list of German goals.  
German foreign policy has its specific features formed by special role 
concepts, especially by the concepts of civilian power, middle power and trade 
state. Civilian power promotes multilateralism, institution-building and 
supranational integration and tries to constrain the use of force in international 
relations through national and international norms. The ideal civilian power 
initiates and promotes multilateral co-operation, which is a policy based on the 
assumption that national interests are interdependent. Moreover, civilian power 
is typical of value-based foreign policy. It promotes good governance, 
democratisation and sustainable development.
4
 
The concept of the middle power suffers from a lack of definitional 
clarity. Generally speaking, middle powers are states with a special status in the 
international system because they are neither powerful enough to be great, nor 
insignificant enough to be minor.
5
 In terms of their behavior, they are 
characterized by their willingness and effort to engage in global matters using 
international institutions. This stems from the need to overcome comparative 
differences in material resources of influence in comparison with resources 
possessed by superpowers. Middle powers rely on their credibility and make 
use of the advantage of their technological skills, experience and national 
resources. Multilateral cooperation plays a primary role in their foreign policy, 
while their multilateral modus operandi stresses the need to act diplomatically 
                                               
2  “Eastern Partnership,” European External Action Service, 2016, accessed February 5, 2018, 
https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership/419/easternpartnershipen.     
3  Justyna Gotkowska, “Germany and the Eastern Partnership,” OSW Commentary Centre 
for Eastern Studies, issue 37 (2010): 1, accessed February 5, 2018, 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/ sites/default /files/commentary370.pdf. 
4  Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Germany as a Civilian Power? The 
Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 2001), 2006. 
5  Robert W. Murray, “Middlepowermanship and Canadian Grand Strategy in the 21st 
Century,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 14, no. 2 (2013): 
90.  
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only in a small number of special matters, balancing their national interests and 
potential opportunities for spreading their influence.
6
 
A trade state, defined by Richard Rosecrance, focuses on economic gains 
and welfare and abstains from territorial expansion or autarky.
7
 Its main goal is 
to promote free trade. Free trade is a guarantee for economic development and 
growth. A trade state is interested in intensive economic relations with other 
states and is interdependent both economically and in the areas of security and 
defence. The primary goals of a trade state are national welfare, improving its 
status in international politics through intensive cooperation with other states 
within international institutions and organizations, as well as the allocation of 
resources in its domestic politics within the functional trading system. Its 
defence spending is low, as it can negatively influence its economy; 
consequently, its membership in defence and security alliances and 
organizations is rather formal, and without active engagement.
8
 
This article deals with German expectations of the role played by the V4 
countries in the EaP initiative. The study defends the argument that despite 
some discrepancies between V4 countries and Germany in recent years, with the 
migration crisis topping the list, the activities of the V4 states within the EaP are 
in line with German expectations to a significant extent. Moreover, the attitudes 
of V4 states and Germany concerning the conception of the EaP are largely 
compatible with each other. In other words, V4 policies towards the EaP do not 
represent a bone of contention with Germany that would disrupt the intensive 
German-V4 states cooperation.  
In order to identify German expectations of the V4 countries towards the 
EaP, the authors conducted 35 interviews with German policy-makers as well as 
foreign and security policy experts. Ten out of the total number of interviews 
were conducted with members of the German Parliament (Bundestag) between 
March and July 2015, ranging across a wide spectrum of German political 
parties. The remaining interviews were realized with members of the German 
foreign and security policy community and were conducted from October 2017 
to September 2018. This group is formed of experts of the European Council on 
Foreign Relations Berlin, the German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs (SWP), the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), the Peace 
Research Institute Frankfurt, Bundeswehr University Munich, the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation Berlin, and the Hanns Seidel Foundation Munich.  
 
                                               
6  David A. Cooper, “Somewhere between Great and Small: Disentangling the Conceptual 
Jumble of Middle, Regional and ‘Niche Powers’,” The Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations 14, no. 2 (2013): 26.  
7  Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State. Commerce and Conquest in the 
Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 47. 
8  Ibid., 47.  
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Germany and the Eastern Partnership 
 
After the unification, Germany had to look for a new, long lasting, 
functioning order in Europe as a whole. It had to secure its stability and 
prosperity in the national, European and international framework, and it had to 
face global problems. One of the proper political and economic solutions was to 
guarantee the transformation process in the East not only through help and 
cooperation but also through the export of norms and institutions, i.e. applying a 
milieu-shaping strategy in the East. This project included the idea of the EU and 
NATO Eastern enlargement. For Russia and other post-Soviet republics 
(Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova), it 
meant pursuing an inclusive partnership/association policy with the EU as well 
as cooperative security. Germany and the V4 had the same approach about the 
EaP countries. Germany is interested not only in the stability of this region, but 
also in the external EU border, and it tries to secure wealth and peace in this 
region. In Germany’s view, the EU could apply similar instruments in its 
support of the EaP countries as it did to the Central European countries in order 
to prepare them for further EU integration. These instruments include twinning, 
free trade areas, state administration reform and others. Germany promotes 
setting an EU mechanism for bilateral assistance and multilateral cooperation 
with the EaP countries, and it also promotes defining a form of cooperation that 
does not prevent future EU integration. On the question of the EaP countries’ 
full membership to the EU, Germany does not want to block future EaP 
countries from achieving membership. However, it stresses the importance of 
the focus on the readiness of these countries and a proper analysis of the degree 
to which they share common values such as democracy, freedom and human 
rights. EU foreign policy should be led by active engagement and aspire to 
strongly influence the policy of neighboring states. Germany welcomed the 
initiative of the new member states such as Poland in the creation of the EaP. It 
showed its interest in cooperation with the six EaP states because it wanted to 
spread European values and to ensure economic prosperity in the Eastern 
European and Southern Caucasus region. Moreover, Germany makes a 
provision for Russia’s special position as a partner with its own interests in the 
region. For Germany, cooperation with EaP countries plays a key role; however, 
an EU enlargement including the EaP countries is not on the table.
9
 Especially 
against the backdrop of the ongoing Ukrainian crisis, Germany stresses that the 
Association Treaty with Ukraine does not aim to foster EU membership and 
                                               
9  Vladimír Handl, Německo v čele Evropy? SRN jako civilní mocnost a hegemon eurozony 
(Germany at the head of Europe? FRG as civilian power and Eurozone hegemon) 
(Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2011), 32, 224-225. 
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does not provide a timetable for future Ukrainian EU integration. After the 
Russian illegal annexation of Crimea, Germany was initially reluctant to impose 
sanctions on Russia. Despite a very strong business lobby, Germany finally 
forged a consensus on anti-Russian sanctions in the EU and has become a 
proponent of them.
10
  
Labor migration, economic development and capital transfer also play 
important roles in the EaP. International scientific exchange predominantly took 
place during the 2007-2013 period within the framework of Erasmus Mundus 
and Tempus, which supported scientific mobility with further migration. While 
the Erasmus Mundus program focused on mobility activities and on 
encouraging partnerships between institutions from the EU and from the partner 
countries, Tempus IV focused on the reform and modernization of higher 
education systems in the neighboring region. Neighboring countries and Russia 
benefitted from a budget of around EUR 670 million during the 2007-2013 
programming period for the Erasmus Mundus and Tempus programs. As part of 
the EU’s strengthened ENP and mobility policy, the financial allocation for the 
2011-2013 period almost doubled compared to preceding years, through a 
sizeable top-up that came following the 2011 review of the ENP. In total, 5,187 
students (undergraduate, master’s, doctorate and post-doctorate levels) and staff 
members from the Neighborhood East countries, which are Ukraine, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and 6,221 from Neighborhood 
South countries, benefited from scholarships within the framework of Erasmus 
Mundus Partnerships between 2007 and 2013. Within Erasmus Mundus Joint 
Programs, 695 EaP nationals benefited from mobility to follow a joint Erasmus 
Mundus master’s or doctorate.11 
Some authors have examined the facets of migration and remittances and 
explored the role of emigrants as actors in development and partnership 
throughout the world.
12
 Remittances have the most positive effect in terms of 
                                               
10  Elisabeth Pond and Hans Kundnani, “Germany’s Real Role in the Ukraine Crisis. Caught 
Between East and West,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 2 (2015), accessed February 5, 2018, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/eastern-europe-caucasus/germany-s-real-role-ukraine -
crisis. 
11  Ganna Kharlamova and Oleksandr Chernyak, “The EU and the Eastern partnership: 
scientific network and macroeconomic effects via bilateral relations,” in EU Relations 
with Eastern Partnership: Strategy, Opportunities and Challenges, eds. Carlos E. Pacheco 
Amaral, Gaga Gabrichidze, Ioan Horga, Anatoliy Kruglashov [et al.], International 
Conference (Editura Universității din Oradea: Chişinău, Chernivtsi, Tbilisi, 2016), 300. 
12  Judith van Doorn. “Migration, remittances and development,” Labour Education 4, no. 
129 (2002): 48–53; Richard H. Adams JR. and John Page, “Do International Migration 
and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?,” World Development 33, no. 
10 (2005): 1645–1669; Ganna Kharlamova and Kateryna Taran, “Migrant networks for 
human capital forming in Ukraine,” Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of 
Kyiv. Economics, no. 117 (2010): 46-49; Ganna Kharlamova and Maria Naumova, 
“Міграція як складова процесу формування людського капіталу України” (Migration 
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boosting human development in the countries where the state perceives 
migration as an effective labor export strategy. Regarding the impact of 
migration on the economic development of the EU, it is apparent that the 
balance of costs and benefits is positive for both sending and receiving 
countries. Costs can be reduced, and benefits maximized using appropriate 
policies that facilitate mobility and integration of migrants and their families, 
and that help manage the economic consequences of large remittance flows. 
Labor migrants from the EaP countries could help the member states of the 
European Union to fill skills gaps at all levels over the next few years, as the 
demographic transition intensifies in Europe. For the EaP, economic 
development is primarily affected by whether the elimination of visas will 
impact the migration levels from the Eastern European states to the V4 
countries and the EU member states. Visa abolition will not dramatically 
increase migration from the Eastern European countries to the EU member 
states, although the immediate effect of visa abolition might result in a slight 
increase of migration stocks in the V4 and EU countries.
13
 
The Riga summit in 2015 was a key event for the Eastern dimension of 
the EU’s foreign policy. The strategic significance of EU’s Eastern policy has 
been highlighted by Russia’s pressure on Armenia to not sign the Association 
Agreements, the ongoing instability in Moldova, a new foreign policy style in 
Belarus, the Maidan in Kyiv, the invasion and annexation of Crimea, and finally 
the Russian-Ukrainian war in the Donbas. It was expected that Germany, as the 
strongest economic power in Europe and the leader in Europe’s sanctions policy 
on Russia, would be one of the driving forces at the Riga summit. This was, 
however, not the case. As Gustav Gressel put it, “German foreign policy 
machinery is still both too progressive and too conservative to come up with 
new policy ideas for the ENP.”14 
On the one hand, Germany has opted for tightening economic 
cooperation with the partner countries by signing deals on deep free trade areas 
and harmonizing part of the legislation of these countries with the acquis 
communautaire. On the other hand, Germany does not want the EaP to evolve 
and turn into an initiative that offers the partner countries prospects of 
membership and antagonizes Russia. Therefore, Germany has tried to 
counteract any elements of the EaP that would help it develop in the 
aforementioned direction. Moreover, Germany has set its own bilateral 
cooperation with partner countries in the East above the joint projects of the 
Eastern Partnership. In doing so, Berlin’s guiding principle is that German 
                                                                                                                   
as warehouse of process shaping people's capital in Ukraine), Економіка та держава, 
no. 4 (2010): 32-36. 
13  Kharlamova and Chernyak, “The EU and the Eastern partnership,” 304-305. 
14  Gustav Gressel, “Germany and the Eastern Partnership: the view from Berlin,” ECFR 
Riga Series Views from the EU (2015): 5. 
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money allocated for the projects on development cooperation in the East should 
first and foremost bring political and economic benefits to Germany. 
Consequently, German foreign policy towards EaP countries is based on the 
following presumptions: Firstly, EaP countries are attractive to German 
exporters and investors because of their prospects for economic growth and a 
growing domestic demand, cheap labor force, geographic proximity, cultural 
bonds and the fact that German companies have broadened their knowledge of 
the region and its specific character. Secondly, the EaP should not become a 
pre-accession instrument that would fuel membership expectations among the 
partner countries and their “advocates” in the EU member states. Germany 
stresses that this initiative should be perceived exclusively as part of the ENP 
and be bound by its confines. Berlin therefore objects to any declarations and 
actions within the EaP framework that may emphasize the exceptionality of the 
partner countries in their relations with the EU, and which could eventually 
become an incentive for negotiations concerning their possible accession in the 
future. Thirdly, the EaP must not antagonize Moscow or jeopardize the strategic 
partnership between the EU and Russia. Germany has been guided by the 
“Russia first” principle, although this approach has backfired with Germany’s 
support for the EU’s greater economic involvement in the Eastern neighborhood 
and bilateral activity in these countries.
15
 
The Ukrainian crisis has had major consequences for the region. The EaP 
helped precipitate the Ukraine conflict and now serves as a durable platform for 
the European Union to counter Russia’s projection of power.16 According to 
several German foreign policy experts, Germany behaves as an agenda setter, as 
a middle power special. Its interest was to negotiate the Minsk Protocol in the 
so-called Normandy Format with France and Poland. The same experts have 
also stated that Germany has used its well-developed diplomacy in the Ukraine 
crisis.
17
 Nevertheless, the Ukrainian crisis did not make space for cooperation 
between the V4 and Germany in the context of the V4’s active engagement in 
the transformation process in Ukraine, with the exception of Poland. Germany 
and Poland have been the two European Union member states most deeply 
involved in advising on and assisting structural reforms in Ukraine. The 
informal division of labor seemed to be that Germany has taken on energy, 
financial, and economic issues, while Poland has looked after administration 
and decentralization. Frequent consultations and visits took place between 
                                               
15  Gotkowska, “Germany and the Eastern Partnership,” 13. 
16  “With Ukraine in Crisis, EU Courts Russia's Periphery,” Stratfor (2015), accessed 
February 5, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ukraine-crisis-eu-courts-russias-
periphery.  
17  Record from interview 3. Interview with an expert of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 
October 25, 2017; Record from interview 4. Interview with an expert of the Bundeswehr 
University Munich, May 9, 2018.    
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German and Ukrainian officials and politicians, and plenty of working and 
advisory groups were busy on the issues involved. However, this was happening 
as part of a bilateral policy, which paid little attention to the ENP’s instruments 
because they were perceived as too weak and too slow.
18
 
Currently, the cooperation between European countries and the Eastern 
partners is influenced by several crises and problems the EU has to face. 
Populist success in the French, German and Austrian parliamentary elections, 
rule of law crises in Eastern Europe, and rising separatist movements have all 
been parts of the overlapping crises. These processes reflect the member states’ 
divergent visions of the balance between the EU’s foundational values, on the 
one hand, and security and stability, on the other hand. The imbalance between 
security and values, as well as nationalism and integration, inevitably influences 
the EU’s external policies, such as its policy vis-à-vis Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia. In anticipation of the EaP Summit in November 2017, it was important 
to discuss the challenges arising from the EU’s overlapping internal crises, and 
to look into the opportunities to tackle them.
19
 
A very important step in the area of economic cooperation was achieved 
on the occasion of the EaP summit, where EU leaders met with their six Eastern 
partners to agree on the future priorities of their partnership and developed the 
joint working document “Eastern Partnership – focusing on key priorities and 
deliverables,” the Eastern Partnership’s 20 Deliverables for 2020. The priorities 
focus on four key areas of cooperation in order to achieve stronger economy, 
governance, connectivity and society. Regarding the strengthening of the 
economy, both the investment and business environments, as well as unlocking 
the growth of potential Small and Medium-sized Enterprises’, are to be 
improved. New job opportunities at the local and regional levels shall be 
created, digital markets shall be harmonized and intra-regional trade among 
partner countries and the EU shall be supported as well. In terms of stronger 
governance, EU and EaP officials agreed to strengthen the rule of law and anti-
corruption mechanisms, to support the implementation of key judicial reforms 
and public administration reforms and to guarantee stronger security 
cooperation. Stronger connectivity means extending the TEN-T core networks 
and transport, increasing energy supply security, enhancing energy efficiency 
and use of renewable energy and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, 
political representatives of both sides expect further progress on Visa 
Liberalization Dialogues and Mobility Partnerships, in order to strengthen 
investment in young people’s skills, entrepreneurship and employability, to 
establish an EaP European school and last but not least to integrate EaP and EU 
                                               
18  Gressel, “Germany and the Eastern Partnership,” 5.   
19  Maryna Rabinovych, “The Eastern Partnership and the various EU crises,” New Eastern 
Europe (2017), accessed March 4, 2018, http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/11/15/eastern-
partnership-various-eu-crises/.  
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research and innovation systems and programs.
20
 Although the EaP is getting 
very low marks as a security promotion and democratization tool, from a purely 
functional viewpoint it is moving forward and advancing its economic mission 
vis-à-vis the frontrunners — Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. Meanwhile, 
Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan are staying at arm’s length, with their leaders 
and elites unwilling to sign on to Brussels’ political conditionality.21  
Moreover, the ongoing rule of law crises in Poland and Hungary invoked 
a debate within the EU, aimed at critically reflecting on the EU’s experiences of 
value-promotion in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany is trying hard to make 
this a constructive and cooperative relationship, but there are the fundamental 
difficulties associated with the authoritarian and populist turn in Eastern 
Europe.
22
 These domestic policy turns, particularly in Poland, might have a 
significant negative impact on mutual cooperation even in the Ukraine case. It 
seems Germany has lost its strategic Central European partner, since Germany 
originally relied on Poland as an important partner in the sphere of defense and 
security.
23
 
As a result of these democratic changes, the Union identified the 
consensual rule of law benchmarks and multiple ideas for monitoring the 
adherence to values both within the Union and externally. The most important 
takeaway from the debate was the need for clarity when it comes to what sorts 
of values the EU should promote and what it seeks to achieve. This trend 
towards a more precise definition of cooperation goals was then manifested in 
the above-mentioned EaP’s 20 Deliverables for 2020, and in the coming years it 
will also be extended to the EU’s bilateral cooperation with its neighbors. 
Moreover, in terms of the endangered security and stability in Europe, both 
security and stability represent the crucial targets the EU seeks to achieve in the 
neighborhood, given Russia’s presence in the region. For the EU it is thus 
crucial to develop new strategies to engage in peacekeeping in the region, 
especially in the diplomatic domain, in form of stronger political support for the 
Minsk process or engaging France and Germany.
24
 
To sum up, Germany has indeed been one of the biggest supporters of the 
EaP within ENP, though it has not sought to alter the nature of political 
                                               
20  “20 Deliverables for 2020: Bringing tangible results for citizens,” European Union 
(2017), accessed March 4, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20_ 
deliverables_for_2020. pdf. 
21  Dimitar Bechev, “Understanding the Contest between the EU and Russia in Their Shared 
Neighborhood,” Problems of Post-Communism 62, no. 6 (2015): 340-349. 
22  Record from interview 11. Interview with a professor from Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, November 29, 2017.    
23  Record from interview 12. Interview with an expert of the Hanns Seidel Stiftung 
München, May 8, 2018; Record from interview 14. Interview with an expert of the 
Ludwig Maximilian University Munich, May 9, 2018.  
24  Rabinovych, “The Eastern Partnership.” 
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relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbors. Instead, Berlin has opted to 
keep the status quo. The priority has remained on economic integration in terms 
of the tightening economic cooperation with the Eastern partners who act more 
in line with the trade state concept than with the concept of civilian power. 
Democracy promotion typical for a civilian power was not so important from 
the German point of view. Germany did not want to antagonize Russia with its 
participation in the EaP, and this aligns with some features of middle power. In 
order to avoid any antagonism, Germany used its privileged position in the EU 
to sidestep any EaP tendencies that might transform the initiative into an offer 
of EU membership. Compared to the intensive engagement of France in the 
Union for the Mediterranean, Germany remained cautious of increasing the 
significance of the EaP initiative.
25
   
 
 
German Expectations About the Role of the V4 Countries in 
the Eastern Partnership 
 
It is evident from the interviews with German political representatives 
that there is a consensus across the entire German political spectrum regarding 
the V4 role in EaP. Germany views the V4 as states that, depending on the 
constellation of domestic political forces during the 1990s, underwent more or 
less successful political and economic transformation towards democracy and 
market economy. These states are now able to share their experiences with other 
Eastern European states in their efforts to integrate into European and 
transatlantic structures. From the German perspective, an active approach in 
supporting the EaP states could be adopted by providing know-how in the 
reformation process as well as experience given by each V4 country in a 
specific way depending on the intensity of their relations – Slovakia and Poland, 
for example, can share their experience with Ukraine, while Poland can do so 
with Belarus as well, based on the degree of the development of mutual bilateral 
relations and geographical location.
26
 
Germany expects the V4 to adopt a very active approach to the Ukrainian 
crisis, in the context of the policy of EaP and the possibility of using the 
potential and experience of V4 countries in the reformation and transformation 
process, as well as in the other five states of the Eastern Partnership.  
Nevertheless, according to a political representative, the level of activity 
of the V4 in the transformation processes in the EaP states depends on the level 
                                               
25  Gotkowska, “Germany and the Eastern Partnership,” 5.  
26  Record from interview 7, Interview with chief deputy of the German-Polish Parliamentary 
Friendship Group (SPD), July 02, 2015. Record from interview 8, Interview with chair of 
the German-Slovak Parliamentary Friendship Group (CDU/CSU), May 05, 2015. 
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of democracy itself and the completion of the transformation process in the 
Central European states. A Bundestag member highlighted the obvious 
differences in democracy between Poland and the above-mentioned three other 
V4 states.
27
 
One German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Member of Parliament (MP) 
saw each of the four V4 states as a suitable role model for the EaP countries, as 
the Central European states have managed to learn from their own reforms.
28
 A 
fellow party member believed that the V4’s experience with the transformation 
process could be used for the states of the EaP because of their ability to share 
different experiences with unique transformation process development 
simultaneously, and the cooperation depends on the bilateral relations level of 
V4 states with the EaP states.
29
 An MP of Die Linke, who regarded Poland as 
the most suitable role model for the transformation process for the EaP states, 
shared a similar opinion, as Poland has succeeded in transforming itself into a 
functioning democracy, whilst the other three V4 states do not represent stable 
democracies. A more important role will be played by the ability of the Eastern 
Partnership’s states to implement essential reforms, and the development of 
internal affairs in these states seems to be important.
30
 
 As the chair of the German-Slovak Parliamentary Friendship Group 
(CDU/CSU) put it, EaP states had to decide on how and whether to integrate 
into the European structures; yet the proximity of the V4 to the EaP states have 
been a suitable precondition for both sharing experiences and cooperation 
between the V4 and Germany in supporting the EaP states in their reformation 
processes.
31
  
Even though it is acknowledged that the V4 countries have considerable 
potential for sharing their experience with the EaP countries in the 
transformation process, a reserved attitude is visible in parts of the German 
security community towards the actual performance of the V4 countries. In this 
sense, a former DGAP analyst did not perceive a very positive outlook for the 
development of cooperation between Germany and the V4 in EaP.
32
 According 
to an SWP analyst, similarly, the V4 – despite its favorable geopolitical location 
– has not served as an engine of Eastern politics, even though some of its states 
                                               
27  Record from interview 6. Interview with the chair of the Polish-German Parliamentary 
Group (Die Linke), May 6, 2015. 
28  Record from interview 5. Interview with the chair of the German-Czech Parliamentary 
Group of the Bundestag (SPD), June 16, 2015. 
29  Record from interview 7. 
30  Record from interview 6.  
31  Record from interview 8.  
32  Record from interview 9. Interview with a program worker of the research institute of the 
DGAP, June 9, 2015. 
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take a very active part in this policy area, such as Poland partnering with 
Sweden in launching the EaP project.
33
 
When assessing the possibilities of German-V4 cooperation and the German 
expectations of the role of V4 states as supporters of the transformation of the EaP 
states, it is necessary to stress the fact that Germany has rethought the importance of 
the EaP for the EU mainly due to escalating tensions between Russia and European 
states. For the V4, the EaP has become an essential tool in organizing an 
institutional forum for discussions about visa policies, agreements about free trade, 
strategic partner agreements, as well as for promoting democracy and intensifying 
civic society in the immediate neighborhood of the V4.
34
 
 
 
The Visegrad Countries and the Eastern Partnership 
 
Warsaw, a strong supporter of democratization and Europeanization of 
the Eastern neighborhood, proposed the EaP and still remains committed to the 
EaP, despite the ongoing domestic political development. In fact, the 
stabilization of the region and the guarantee of security are the main factors of 
that involvement.
35
 Nevertheless, Poland’s perception is not completely shared 
across Europe. Many countries believe that the EU’s expansion to the East 
formed the root cause of the geopolitical conflict with Russia. This was one 
reason why, at the Riga summit on the future of the EaP, Warsaw reiterated the 
progress and commitments that had been made so far, rather than launching new 
initiatives or articulating far-reaching visions. At the Riga summit, Poland 
declared that the EU needed to reconfirm its commitments towards the EU’s 
Eastern neighbors, especially towards those who have already signed the Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA).
36
 Polish development 
cooperation is based upon both bilateral relations as well as the EU’s EaP 
projects. Among the most urgent problems of the cooperation are intensification 
of democracy, improvement in governance, better border management, 
agricultural and rural development and the strengthening of entrepreneurship. 
Multilateral support is based on common projects, which are financed through 
                                               
33  Record from interview 10. Interview with an expert of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, July 8, 2015. 
34  Vladimír Bilčík, András Hettyey, Michal Kořan and Konrád Popławski, The V4 and 
Germany: Potentials, limits and opportunities of a strengthened cooperation. Long-term 
analysis within the project Think Visegrad V4 Think-Tank Platform, Think Visegrad. 
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35  Adam Plachciak and Anetta Zielinska, “The Eastern Partnership and the Place of Poland 
in the Development Cooperation,” Transformations in Business & Economics 14, no. 3 
(2015): 93.  
36  Piotr Buras, “Poland and the Eastern Partnership: the view from Warsaw,” ECFR Riga 
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the payments made to the budgets of the international organizations. They 
include specialized institutions, programs and funds that deal with development 
cooperation. The multilateral cooperation depends on Poland’s financial 
engagement within the European Development Fund. In the area of bilateral 
cooperation, over 70% of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs financial 
support has been transferred to democratization or to political and economic 
transformation in the EaP countries. For each country, specific priorities have 
been assigned. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, these are supporting disadvantaged 
groups, environmental protection, agriculture and rural development; in 
Belarus, they are supporting disadvantaged groups, the independent media, civil 
society initiatives, youth and education; in Georgia, they are supporting 
disadvantaged groups, regional development, strengthening the public 
administration and the local government; in Moldova and Ukraine, they are 
supporting public security and border management, regional development, 
strengthening public administration and local government, small and medium-
sized entrepreneurship, and job creation. Overall, Poland is the most significant 
international donor of development aid to the EaP countries of all V4 states.
37
 
The other V4 states pick rather selectively from the menu of the EaP, too. 
For example, Hungary is mostly interested in three of the Eastern partners 
(Moldova, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan), and even a notion of “the East” means 
different things for Hungarian decision-makers than it does to their Polish 
counterparts.
38
 According to the Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto, 
Hungary supports strengthening the European Union’s EaP program in order to 
establish pragmatic and civilized cooperation between Western and Eastern 
Europe. He also called for a strategic partnership between the EU and 
Azerbaijan, which was important for securing gas supplies.
39
 At the V4 and EaP 
countries meeting in August 2017, Szijjárto called for the adoption of the most 
ambitious and courageous forging of alliances at the upcoming summit of EU 
and EaP countries in November in Brussels. In addition, the V4 states also try to 
prevent any reduction in the budget available for this purpose in the 
community’s next, seven-year programming period.40 With relation to the 
results achieved so far, the Minister listed the visa-free travel agreements 
concluded with Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the association and free trade 
                                               
37  Plachciak and Zielinska, “The Eastern Partnership,” 101-102.  
38  Péter Marton, “The Sources of Visegrad Conduct: A Comparative Analysis of V4 Foreign 
Policy-making,” The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 21, no. 4 (2012): 14-15. 
39  “Foreign minister calls for strengthening Eastern Partnership,” Daily News Hungary 
(2015), accessed March 4, 2018, https://dailynewshungary.com/foreign-minister-calls-for-
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40  “The V4 regards the forging of eastern alliances as strategically important,” Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (2017), accessed March 4, 2018, http://www.kormany-of-
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agreement with Ukraine. He also spoke about energy security criteria, pointing 
out that linking the Southern Bass Corridor to Central Europe would be 
impossible without the Eastern partners.
41
 
Slovakia belonged, even in the period prior to its entry into the EU, to the 
states supporting the idea of institutionalizing a separate Eastern dimension of 
the Union. Beginning in 2003, the country officially supported democratization 
processes in the states of the former Soviet Union, with a preferential 
orientation toward Ukraine and Belarus. Slovakia advocated Ukraine’s future 
EU and NATO memberships and showed its support for the EaP project, as it 
was welcomed by Slovakia as an opportunity to strengthen cooperation and as a 
chance to achieve a “new quality” of relations between the East European 
nations and the EU. In 2008, the then Foreign Minister, Ján Kubiš, stated that 
the program was perceived by Slovakia as “a very good preparation for the 
future unification of all of Europe’s parts in one European project.”42 Slovakia’s 
involvement was especially underlined in the field of building a free trade zone 
and a liberalization of the visa regime with Ukraine,
43
 which was finally 
achieved in 2017.  
It is interesting to observe how the EaP moved up the list of external 
relations priorities of the 2009 Czech EU Presidency.
44
 Developing the Eastern 
dimension of ENP had been on the Czech agenda since the beginning, but rather 
as something that the Czech government was obliged to include due to its 
geographical position and history, previous activities in the V4 and as a 
perceived foreign policy priority. Many external factors explain why, as the 
Czech Presidency approached, the EaP became more important. A strong 
incentive to turn the EaP into the flagship initiative of the Czech EU Presidency 
came soon after its start with the gas crisis between Ukraine and Russia that 
broke out in January 2009, which seriously affected some of the EU member 
states. The main points that the Czech diplomacy had to repeatedly underline 
was that the EaP is not anti-Russian, that it does not seek the re-distribution of 
ENP funds in favor of its Eastern neighbors, that it does not undermine the 
existing community policies and instruments and, last but not least, that it does 
not mean a green light for the six countries concerned to join the EU in the 
                                               
41  Ibid.  
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future.
45
 In 2017, the Czech State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Petr Gajdušek, 
highlighted the fact that the Czech Republic would like to reinforce pragmatic 
cooperation; at the same time, he argued that the “[c]ooperation must enforce 
the differences between the individual countries and an individual approach 
must be applied with relation to every country of the Partnership, but the goal 
and the opportunities presented must remain uniform.”46 
As regards Ukraine, the V4 countries are engaged in providing its unity, 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within the framework of its 
internationally recognized borders and they declare their absolute support for all 
the endeavors aimed at de-escalating the conflict at the border and finding a 
political solution that can be accepted by all the conflict parties involved, while 
the Minsk Agreements and their full implementation remain a key tool for 
achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict.
47
 
The Riga summit also played a key role in 2015. In the months leading up 
to the summit, the EU member states and the EaP members negotiated the 
wording of the statement to be adopted at the end of the summit. Countries 
including Poland lobbied to include criticism of Russia’s support for separatists 
in Eastern Ukraine. Others in Western and Southern Europe, including 
Germany, opposed any language that would antagonize Russia or support the 
EU membership aspirations of EaP states. They supported the idea of using the 
initiative to counter Russia’s influence in the borderlands but did not want to 
expand the European Union during its time of crisis.
48
 However, the Ukrainian 
crisis remains crucial in the policy of the V4 countries to the European 
Neighborhood Policy, as the security of Europe – in terms of both defense and 
energy – is an important accent of the V4 cooperation. The V4 was engaged in 
strengthening Ukrainian security through NATO activities, and two-dozen 
Ukrainian soldiers were part of the V4 EU Battle Group.
49
   
Despite some critical points in the common attitude between Germany 
and the V4 states towards Ukraine, Russia and the EaP, the V4 countries 
undertook some successful steps within their joint V4 project; these focused on 
the know-how transfer to Ukraine regarding the implementation and successful 
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completion of reforms launched in the areas of decentralization, management of 
public finances, fight against corruption, energy efficiency, security reforms, 
civil society, education, media, as well as economic development and 
supporting small and mid-sized entrepreneurs.
50
 
Moreover, the V4 countries possess other tools for the support of 
democratization and transformation processes in the EaP countries, in particular 
the Visegrad Four EaP and V4+ programs within the International Visegrad 
Fund.
51
 Via these activities, the V4 contributed to the increase of credibility of 
the EU and NATO in the eyes of their Eastern neighbors.
52
 The International 
Visegrad Fund continued to support the joint projects of organizations and 
individuals from the V4 countries and Eastern Europe through several grant 
schemes aimed at the development of civil society and the building of 
institutions of public administration, including universities.
53
 
At the V4 summit devoted to the EaP in August 2017, the V4 countries 
reaffirmed their strong support for the EaP as a strategic dimension of the ENP 
and a key and active factor of stability, security and economic progress in 
Eastern Europe. They urged the EU to keep the EaP high on its political agenda. 
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs also called for the adequate funding within the 
next Multiannual Financial Framework that would correspond to the priorities 
of the EaP. Additionally, they supported the Eastern Partnership’s focus on 
regional cooperation, inclusivity, common values, mutual accountability, 
differentiation and its multilateral dimension. They reiterated the need to react 
strategically to the consequences of the present challenging geopolitical 
situation, both for the EaP countries and the European Union. In this context, 
they underlined the necessity of continuing the reforms in partner countries to 
strengthen their internal stability, resilience and civilian security. They 
welcomed the new framework agreement with Armenia and called for further 
progress in the ongoing process of negotiations with Azerbaijan, which they 
consider a key partner in terms of energy security and regional stability. They 
acknowledged Belarus’ willingness to deepen the EU–Belarus relationship and 
called for starting further negotiations, aiming at a new framework agreement as 
soon as possible. Visa-free regimes with Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine have 
proved that they bring tangible results for their citizens. Ministers recognized 
Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s desire to continue the visa liberalization dialogue 
and expect further steps in that direction. They also expressed hope for 
relaunching negotiations and finalizing the Visa Facilitation and Readmission 
Agreement with Belarus and welcomed the signing of the Mobility Partnership 
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with the EU by Minsk. Last but not least, this V4 and EaP meeting stressed the 
importance of the Eastern Partnership’s multilateral dimension in strengthening 
cooperation among the partners themselves as well as with the V4 and the EU, 
including territorial, especially cross-border, cooperation. The V4 partners 
agreed that supporting sustainable development along the EU’s external borders, 
reducing differences in living standards, addressing common security challenges 
and enhancing people-to-people contacts across these borders could only be 
effective if cross-border cooperation programs remain high on the agenda.
54
 All 
these results and statements are in accordance with the strategy of the EU 
foreign policy towards the EaP states, which means that both the V4 countries 
and Germany are able to find ways for a more intensive and effective ENP. 
 
 
Conclusions 
   
The topic of the EaP is still open and up-to-date, yet it is marginalized 
due to more severe problems and present challenges that the EU must face, such 
as the refugee and migrant crisis. The V4 countries and Germany seem to be 
close partners in the EaP case. They all are interested in support and financial 
aid for and transformation of these six EaP states. Thus, there are many 
opportunities for cooperation between the V4 countries and Germany in EaP. 
There is a consensus across the entire German political spectrum regarding the 
V4 role in EaP. In this respect, V4 states are expected to serve as a source of 
inspiration, as a success story of political and economic transformation, and 
should play the role of knowledge providers to EaP states. German expectations 
are not in contradiction with the V4 states’ preferences. In recent years, the V4 
countries have indeed shared their experience with the EaP states in the areas of 
democratization and strengthening the market economy. In other words, they 
have followed a policy that is generally appreciated by Berlin.  
Moreover, the geopolitical location of these states in the center of Europe 
and their proximity to the states of the EaP contribute to the further 
development of the aforementioned regional cooperation in the V4+ format. As 
such, the EaP does not belong to the problematic issues between Germany and 
the V4, and the involved countries can benefit from it. 
The only departure from this common line are Poland’s occasional 
attempts to conceive the EaP as a tool which would promote future EU 
enlargement, which is clearly in direct contradiction to German current 
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preferences. Germany encourages the EaP countries to emulate the example of 
the V4 as regards the process of political and economic transformation, 
however, the EaP countries are not supposed to expect to join the EU. Poland is 
aware of the German position and is not ready to seriously promote an opposite 
idea that would be directed against German interests. Overall, the EaP is 
definitely not an apple of discord between Germany and the V4 and it does not 
threaten the intensive cooperation between them.  
